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METAPHORS AND MODELS OF LAW:
THE JUDGE AS PRIEST
Philip Soper*

l.

INTRODUCTION

The reasons that prompt people to try to identify laws or legal
systems in advance of encounter are varied. One is that laws, though
less concrete than chairs, are equally capable of posing obstacles to
conduct: they can be stumbled over. If the desire to avoid such
contact were the sole reason for trying to decide "what law is,''
Holmes' aphorism would work fairly well: by predicting judicial decisions and calculating the likelihood of avoiding accompanying sanctions, one could play a good game of "bad man's" bluff around legal
obstacles to chosen courses of action.
The claim that law is identified by more than this predictive aspect arises when one takes into account the perspective of individuals
other than Holmesian "bad men"-the judge, for example, who
looks to the law as a guide for, rather than a prediction of, his decision;1 or the individual who believes that valid norms yield obligations
whether or not they are accompanied by sanctions.
This variety of perspectives from which to view a phenomenon
as complex as that of law2 poses a problem for the legal theorist.
Unlike individuals within the society, the theorist stands outside particular legal systems, seeking features that distinguish such systems
from other social phenomena that they resemble. Like the sociologist or scientist, the legal theorist has no apparent interest other
than that of conceptual clarity. But this attempt at "neutral" definition often meets with two objections. First, the theorist may be told
that the claim that certain features of law are more important or
more the "essence" of law than any other is essentially arbitraryall depends on perspective. Second, he may be told that disputes
about whether certain social structures are or are not "legal systems"

* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Michigan. B.A. 1964, Washington University; J.D. 1969, Harvard University; Ph.D. 1972, Washington University,
-Ed.
1. See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 10-11 (1961).

2. Roscoe Pound, for example, associates distinct views of law with the perspective of individual, judge, lawyer, teacher, lawmaker, and entrepreneur. See R.
POUND, II JURISPRUDENCE 130-31 (1959).
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resemble disputes about whether a loveseat is a chair or a couch:
what is important is not the classification, but the description of
similarities and differences that might make distinct objects suitable
or unsuitable for various purposes.
Both objections can be avoided if the theoretical enterprise is less
ambitious-if one is content, for 'example, to describe prominent features of legal systems without concern for whether the description ,
is also part of the definition of law. This essay takes this less ambitious route in comparing four models of law with respect to their
treatment of one particular legal phenomenon: the concept of legal
obligation. Normative statements to the effect that one "ought" to
obey the law, or that judges "ought" to apply one standard rather
than another, are so commonly made within legal systems that most
theorists attempt to account for this feature in the course of developing a general theory of law. Three such accounts that are examined
· in this essay are drawn from theories of law developed by legal
positivists. The fourth is not. The fourth account anticipates a
model of law that lies somewhere between those developed by legal
positivists on the one hand and by natural law theorists on the other.
This fourth model finds the "essence" of a "legal" system in the fact
that the officials who accept and enforce the system believe that its
fundamental laws are just.
I shall not attempt to prove that the view of legal normativity
entailed by one of these models is preferable to the others as more
or less "essential" to the concept of law. In that sense, the essay
is a preliminary step in the development of a definition of law. At
the same time, I hope that the distinct view of obligation that
emerges from each theory will facilitate intuitive comparisons of each
description with the actual phenomenon of legal obligation as perceived by most subjects in particular legal systems. This comparison
of description and phenomenon should provide at least a starting
point for determining which view, if any, is more accurate and which,
if any, is necessarily linked to the concept of law itself.
The limited goal of this essay is accompanied by three additional
limitations in scope and method. First, the essay is concerned primarily with the connection between legal theory and legal obligation
as it appears from or is ascribed to the role of the judge. The justification for this limitation in perspective builds on two basic intuitions
underlying the claim that "law-applying" rather than "law-creating"
institutions are central to the understanding of law. 3 The first in3. See J. R.Az,

PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS

129-31 (1975).
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tuition is that the goal of the judge, however unobtainable or unrealistic in practice, is ideally to "find" rather than to "make" the law.
To that extent the purpose of the judge and the legal theorist overlap: each is the ally of the other in attempting to discover neutral
features that identify law in general, although the judge is also concerned with applying the general theory to identify the specific
norms of his particular legal system. The second intuition, shared
by legal realists and recent positivists alike, is that there is a connection between efficacy and legal validity that requires one to focus
primarily on law as it is applied and accepted in practice rather than
as it is announced. To identify a system and its norms as legal where
none of the norms are observed in fact is to so exalt theory over
practice as to ignore the phenomenon for which the theory was initially supposed to account.
A second limitation of this essay is that it does not attempt to
analyze or distinguish the concepts of "obligation" or "duty" or
"norm" within the wider category of "ought" statements in general.
That is to say, in distinguishing various descriptions of "legal obligation," I shall be distinguishing primarily the various reasons that a
particular theory seems to accept as prima facie sufficient to explain (from the viewpoint of persons within the system) why one
"ought" to obey the law or why a judge "ought" to apply a particular
standard. These reasons may be self-regarding or other-regarding,
prudential or moral. Whether "prudential oughts" are "norms" is
thus a question with which I shall not be concerned, just as I shall
also not consider the question whether one has a prima facie moral
obligation to obey the law.
This essay is also characterized and necessarily limited by its reliance on the metaphor as a shorthand device for conveying the relation between a particular theory and the account of normativity that
the theory seems to entail. Professor Max Black observes that "[to]
draw attention to a philosopher's metaphors is to belittle him-like
praising a logician for his beautiful handwriting." 4 Black proceeds,
however, both to defend the philosophical use of metaphor and to
suggest that the metaphor may convey cognitive content that cannot
always be conveyed by nonmetaphorical translations. 5 I shall not explore or defend the use of metaphor here beyond noting that it is
a technique to which Professor H. L. A. Hart, whose theory is a primary focus of this essay, also resorts in criticizing his positivist predecessor, Austin. Austin's theory of law, Hart suggests, is the "gun4. M. BLACK, MODELS
5. See id. at 44-47.

AND METAPHORS

25 (1962).
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man situation writ large," 6 to which Hart objects largely because of
alleged defects in the resulting picture of legal obligation. One of
the goals of this essay is to find an appropriate metaphor for Hart's
own version of positivism. More particularly, this essay explores the
following questions: What is the metaphorical role of the judge and
the consequent view of legal obligation implied by the theories of
the three major positivists-Austin, Kelsen and Hart? Is there a
plausible alternative metaphor? What are the implications of the alternative for legal theory and the concept of legal obligation?
II.
A.

FOUR MODELS OF LAW

Austin: The Judge as Henchman

If Austin's view of law as the command of the sovereign is the
"gunman situation writ large," the role of the judge presumably is
that of a "henchman,"7 carrying out or passing on the gunman's
orders, backed by threats, to the subjects of the legal system.
Austin, of course, prefers less pejorative descriptions. For him, the
judge is the "minister" or "trustee" of the sovereign, who communicates the sovereign's orders or exercises tacitly or expressly delegated power to issue orders himself. 8
Hart's criticism of this account is well known and frequently recounted. A theory that describes law as consisting essentially of orders backed by threats (henceforth, the "coercive model" of law)
fails adequately to account for legal obligation. Under the coercive
model, the minimally sufficient reason why one "ought" to obey the
law is the purely prudential one of avoiding the threatened sanction.
Hart concedes that legal systems may exist in which the private citizens in the system view law in just such exclusively coercive terms:
the only reason to obey is to avoid punishment. But, he argues,
there is at least one group of citizens in a legal system-namely
the judges or officials-who view law as imposing obligations, rather
than merely obliging. For this group, deviation from the accepted
legal standards becomes the occasion for legitimate criticism. Within
this group, reasons for following the law are presumably advanced
which do not refer simply to threatened legal sanctions. 0
Just what sorts of reasons for compliance such a group might ad6. H. HART, supra note 1, at 7.
7. See id. at 19.
8. See J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE
263-64 (London 1832).
9. See H. HART, supra note 1, at 79-88, 111-13.

DETERMINED

28, 142 & n.*,
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vance will be considered below. My interest at this point is in the
extent to which Austin's theory must be seen as thoroughly committed to the coercive model of obligation that Hart criticizes. 10 The
difficulty in answering this question arises because Austin, in his lectures on the Province of Jurisprudence Determined, appears primarily concerned with accounting for the relationship between the
sovereign and the ultimate subject of the sovereign's commandHart's private citizen. It is not clear what Austin might have said
if he, like Hart, had turned his attention to the phenomenon of obligation as it appears among the judges of the system.
The text of Austin's lectures provides some basis for supposing
that Austin would not describe obligation among the judges of a system solely in terms of the coercive model. We have already noted
that Austin refers to judges as the "ministers" or "trustees" of the
sovereign. In discussing a sovereign's other political subordinates,
also described as "trustees," Austin indicates that the terms of
the trust may be enforced "by legal, or by merely moral sanctions.
The [trustee] is bound by a positive law or laws: or it is merely
bound by a fear that it may offend . . . in case it shall break the
engagement which it has contracted with [the sovereign]." 11 Austin thus accepts the possibility that the conduct commanded of judges
(application of the sovereign's laws) may not itself be coerced by
a specific threat annexed to the command-a characteristic mark of
all "laws" properly so called. 12
This conclusion accords with the common observation that judges
and officials in modern legal systems such as our own are often said
to breach their official duties, even though no specifically legal punishment is provided for the breach. 13 If the coercive model of law
is thus insufficient, even for Austin, to account for the attitude of
judges in such legal systems toward the "orders" they are carrying
out, how is such official obligation to be described? The question
may be approached, despite Austin's sparse account, by referring to
the basic metaphor of the judge as henchman. Among the reasons a
henchman/ judge might have for complying with the orders of a
10. Hart admits, it should be noted, that Austin's concept of a "command" may
not be reducible to the coercive model and that there may be other aspects of Austin's theory that are not fully consistent with the model. See H. HART, supra note 1,
at 18-20. The point in the text is that even the gunman/henchman metaphor departs in some respects from the coercive model and does so in ways that make the
henchman metaphor arguably applicable to the theories of both Austin and Hart.
11. J. AUSTIN, supra note 8, at 240.
12. See id. at 138-39.
13. See J. RAZ, supra note 3, at 158.
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gunman/ sovereign are the following:
1) The judge may comply because of a threatened legal sanction;
2) Absent the threat of a specific sanction, the judge may
comply for other reasons of self-interest, ranging from the
fear of being criticized or of incurring the sovereign's displeasure, to the desire to remain a henchman and enjoy
the accompanying rewards of power, prestige, and comfort;
3) The judge may independently decide that the sovereign
has a right to command for moral or other reasons.
All of these reasons for compliance, it is suggested, are consistent
both with Austin's theory and with a view of the judge as henchman.
If this suggestion is correct, it raises doubts, as we shall see, about
the extent to which Hart's analysis in fact represents an advance
upon the "gunman situation writ large."
B.

Kelsen: The Judge as Logician

In The Pure Theory of Law, 14 Kelsen rejects the coercive model
of obligation for reasons that remind one of Hart's criticism of Austin:
Everybody understands that it is one thing to say: "This behavior
is a delict according to the law and ought to be punished according
to the law"; and quite a different thing to say: "He who has done
this will probably be punished." . . . The legal statements that one
ought to behave in a certain way cannot be reduced to statements
about present or future facts, because the former do not refer to such
facts, not even to the fact that certain individuals wish that one ought
to behave in a certain way. 15

Kelsen's response to the problem of accounting for or describing
this noncoercive legal "ought" is like the logician's response to the
problem of accounting for the axioms in a logical system: no such
account is possible, at least not within the same system that includes
the axioms. In this respect Kelsen's judge, who makes statements
describing the conditions under which coercive sanctions ought to be
applied, is like the logician: the validity of all such "ought" statements depends on their derivation from a basic norm-that one
ought to behave as the constitution prescribes. The validity of this
basic norm is not open to judicial question but is simply "presupposed."
14. H. KELSEN,
15. Id. at 104.

THE

PURE ToEORY
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(1967).
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Kelsen's theory has led to confusion and criticism on two counts.
First, it has been suggested that the somewhat mystifying notion of
"presupposition" can be replaced with a much simpler and more accurate account of the attitude of the judge toward the basic norm.
The judge, unlike the logician, does not dispassionately posit the ultimate normative premise of the legal system that underlies his particular normative conclusions. Rather, his attitude toward the basic
norm is one of personal commitment, belief, and acceptance. As
Professor Hughes observes:
Christian morals may be said to rest on the presupposition that
Christ was divine; but the existence of a community of Christians
rests on people holding the belief that Christ was divine. In the same
way the existence of a legal community, as opposed to a model code
constructed for the private edification of the draftsman, can ultimately be analyzed only in terms of the actual attitudes and dispositions towards basic procedures of the persons who make up the community.16

Kelsen's theory may also be criticized for its inattention to the
nature of the basic norm. Even logicians, after all, can provide extra-systematic or metatheoretical accounts of the primitives or axioms
of their formal systems. Thus one might also expect Kelsen to discuss whether the basic norm is itself an "ought" proposition and, if
so, what kind of an ought it is.
Commentators have suggested two distinct views of the nature
of such a basic norm. According to the first, the basic norm asserts
that the provisions of the constitution and the resulting legal system
"ought" to be accepted because they are justified. On this view,
one who accepts the basic norm does so because he believes it is
(morally) "acceptable." For such persons "[t]he concepts of the
normativity of the law and of the obligation to obey it are analytically
tied together." 17 According to the second view, the basic norm asserts that the constitution ought to be accepted without regard to its
merits. On this view the fact that the system is accepted by others
is sufficient to explain the normativity of the law, even though there
may be good reasons-reflected in other norms-for refusing to
obey. Dr. Raz calls these two views, respectively, "justified" and
"social" normativity. 18 He also suggests that Kelsen uses only the
concept of justified normativity-i.e., that the "ought" of particular
16. Hughes, Validity and the Basic Norm, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 695, 703 (1971).
17. Raz, Kelsen's Theory of the Basic Norm, 19 AM. J. JURIS. 94, 105 (1974).
See id. at 103.
18. Id. at 103.
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judicial decisions and the basic norms they "presuppose" reflect a
judicial belief that the system itself is justified.
There is another possible interpretation of Kelsen, however, that
does not restrict his theory to the concept of "justified normativity"
and is at the same time more consistent with the metaphor of the
logician and the language of presupposition that permeate Kelsen's
writings. One may argue that Kelsen is committed to no particular
concept of normativity on the part of those internal to the system.
He is simply explaining the logical relationship between "ought"
statements of whatever kind and the basic norm such statements presuppose. Whatever judges mean by the statement that sanctions
"ought" to be applied, that is also the meaning that must be given
to the basic norm. This view, for example, would find even the
coercive model of law compatible with Kelsen's account. If judges
believed that the basic norm "ought" to be accepted only because
of threatened sanctions, then the "ought" statements of particular
legal judgments would also reflect only the same prudential force.
It is true that Kelsen seems to think most judges in most legal sys·tems view the basic norm as justified, rather than as backed by
threats, which explains why much of Kelsen's discussion is in similar
terms: if judges claim sanctions are justified, it must be because for
them the basic norm is also justified. But this claim is "in its character conditional and therefore hypothetical." 19 Kelsen, in short,
may be viewed only ·as insisting, like Hume, that the normative
force of particular legal judgments can only be as great as the normative force of the premises on which the judgment is based. 20
Two passages in Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law may be used as
illustrations. In the first, Kelsen, himself a moral relativist, considers
the possible objection that "the concept of the 'ought' . . . is senseless or merely ideological fallacy": 21
If all meaning is denied to the norm . . . then it would be senseless to say: "this is legally permitted, that is forbidden;" "this belongs
to me, that to you;" "X is entitled and Y is obligated." The thousands of statements in which the law is expressed daily would be
senseless. In contrast to this, the fact is undeniable that everybody
understands readily that it is one thing to say: "A is legally obligated
to pay $1,000 to B," and quite another: "There is a certain chance
that A will pay $1,000 to B." 22
19. H. KELSEN, supra note 14, at 46.
20. See generally D. HUME, TREATISE
I (1739).
21. H. KELSEN, supra note 14, at 101.
22. Id. at 104.

ON HUMAN NATURE,
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It seems clear that Kelsen is here defending an objective concept
of obligation against the moral relativist. But he is defending this
concept on the assumption that it is the concept used by people
within the system. In such cases, the fact that the legal theorist,
when describing a system, believes "oughts" are senseless, does not
mean that the objective sense of obligation is unimportant to those
within the system or can be ignored in giving an accurate theoretical
account of the phenomenon of law. It is because of his sensitivity
to such possibilities that sociologists as well as philosophers can
claim Kelsen as one of their own. But if the judges and officials
of the system are themselves moral relativists, no objective "ought"
will be presupposed. The system will not be viewed as normative,
but it may still be legal. Kelsen's purpose, in short, may be primarily
to account for the empirical fact that most legal systems are viewed
by their officials as normative and objectively justified; but the claim
that only such systems can be "legal" is a definitional claim that Kelsen appears to assume but does not explicitly defend.
A second passage that supports this interpretation may be found
in Kelsen's comparison of a legal community and a gang of robbers.
The only difference between the two, Kelsen suggests, is that in the
coercive order of the terrorizing gang:
no basic norm is presupposed according to which one ought to behave
in conformity with this order. But why is no such basic norm presupposed? Because this order does not have the lasting effectiveness
without which no basic norm is presupposed. . . . · [T]he coercive
order regarded· as the legal order is more effective than the coercive
order constituting the gang. 23
Kelsen in the same passage indicates that, if the gang should succeed
in effectively establishing control over a certain territory, it would
then become a legal system and a state.
The apparent implication of this passage is that a robber gang
becomes a legal order for Kelsen, not because of any change in the
internal normative attitude of the members of the gang, but simply
by becoming able effectively to enforce its orders against nonmembers. The resemblance to Austin's theory of law, with effectiveness
(habitual obedience) as the key to locating independent sovereigns
and thus independent legal systems, is striking. One might, of
course, suggest that Kelsen assumes that a normative, attitudinal
change will occur within the robber gang as a result of increased
effectiveness; i.e., that Kelsen is making empirical claims about the
psychological pre-conditions for adopting the necessary normative at23. Id. at 47, 48.
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titude. But this ascribes to Kelsen an intent to offer "social science
stabs at the psychology of the law abiding citizen" that seems "outside the scope and interest of the pure theory of law." 24
I do not intend to defend further this interpretation as Kelsen's
own, but only to suggest that the interpretation is sufficiently plausible, given ambiguities in Kelsen's writings, that it compounds the
confusion surrounding his theory of the basic norm. There are two
points from the above discussion that I wish to emphasize. The first
is that Kelsen's observation that judges in most legal systems believe
that the system they administer is justified on its merits should be
taken seriously by any legal theory that attempts to account for the
phenomenon of legal obligation. The second is that whether this
attitude is merely coincidental or is an essential aspect of the concept
of law itself is not explicitly addressed and defended by Kelsen, although he appears to assume that the attitude is e~sential to "law."
One major goal of this essay is to explain how Kelsen's assumptions
might be coupled with a theory of law unhampered by the mystification that surrounds the metaphor of the judge as logician.
C.

H. L.A. Hart: The Judge as Game Player

Much of the discussion generated by Hart's book, The Concept
of Law, has focused on the notion of a "rule of recognition," which,
like Kelsen's basic norm, is Hart's ultimate test of legal validity. According to Hart, however, the existence of a legal system depends
on two conditions. In addition to general conformity to the rules
that are valid according to the rule of recognition, the rule of recognition must itself be accepted by certain members (at least the officials) of society. Hart introduces this· notion of acceptance to correct problems we have noted in the theories of Austin and Kelsen.
' is meant to correct defects in Austin's coercive model
"Acceptance"
by providing a more adequate account of the obligatory nature of
the law. It is also meant to replace Kelsen's "obscure" notion of
presupposition25 with a simple empirical reference to the actual practice of the courts and officials of the system.
Despite the key role that this concept thus plays in explaining
legal normativity, Hart spends little time discussing the nature of "acceptance." What discussion does occur is in some respects at odds
with Hart's careful analysis of rules and obligation and his account
of the "internal attitude" that distinguishes following social rules
24. Hughes, supra note 16, at 702.
25. See H. HART, supra note 1, at 245 n.1.
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from habitual conduct and from behavior influenced solely by coercive threats. Consider, for example, the following:
Not only may vast numbers be coerced by laws which they do not
regard as morally binding, but it is not even true that those who do
accept the system voluntarily must conceive of themselves as morally
bound to do so, though the system will be most stable when they do
so. In fact, their allegiance to the system may be based on many
different considerations: oalculations of long-term interest; disinterested interest in others; an unreflecting inherited or traditional attitude; or the mere wish to do as others do. There is indeed no reason
why those who accept the authority of the system should not examine
their conscience and decide that, morally, they ought not to accept
it, yet for a variety of reasons continue to do so. 26

Compare this passage with Hart's earlier explanation of what it
means for a group to accept rules as a common standard of behavior.
Such acceptance, he explains, involves
a critical reflective attitude to certain patterns of behaviour . . .
[that] should display itself in criticism (including self-criticism), demands for conformity, and in acknowledgments that such criticism
and demands are justified, all of which find their characteristic expression in the normative terminology of "ought," "must," and
"should," "right" and "wrong." 27

How can Hart claim that the acceptance of rules as standards of behavior implies a demand for conformity expressed in the normative
terminology of "ought" statements and at the same time claim that
such acceptance may be based, for example, only on one's own selfinterest in such rules?
One possible explanation is that in the first-quoted passage Hart
is talking about the "motives" for acceptance in a psychological
sense. The "reasons" Hart describes for accepting a legal system
would then constitute a report of the causes of the group's behavior,
rather than a description of the group's internal attitudes toward the
rules they accept. But if this is the sense in which the passage is
to be interpreted, it need not concern us here any more than in the
case of Kelsen. Our concern is with what the fact of acceptance
implies in terms of the group's own attitude toward the accepted
standards, rather than with a psychological account of why these particular attitudes develop. Besides, Hart's claim that one can decide
after examination of his conscience that he ought not to accept the
basic standards of the legal system suggests that this passage is not
meant purely as a psychological explanation of why such standards
are accepted.
26. Id. at 198-99.
27. Id. at 56.
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A more plausible explanation is that Hart in both passages is willing to allow the normative terminology backing the demand for conformity to range over the full variety of "ought" statements, from
the prudential ("you ought to put antifreeze in, your car") to the
aesthetic ("you ought not to wear a striped tie with that shirt") to
the moral ("you ought not to steal"). This would explain why one
can "accept" a legal system for reasons of self-interest, while admitting that there are good moral reasons for not accepting it. 28
The trouble with this view is that if the normative language typifying "acceptance" is to range over any and all types of nonmoral
"oughts," it becomes difficult to distinguish Hart's theory from Austin's. Imagine a legal system in which acceptance means no more
than is suggested above by Hart. . Rex and his judge/ officials, who
happen to have a monopoly on the state's coercive power, accept the
rule that whatever Rex enacts is law. Their acceptance is based
solely on the fact that Rex enacts laws which benefit himself and
his judges at the expense of the rest of society. Rex even admits
that morally his rules ought not to be accepted, but he and his officials continue to do so for reasons of self-interest. Presumably
"obligation" in this system is found solely in the fact that officials
who deviate from the accepted rules are met with the criticism that
the rules are in the deviant's own self-interest-like explaining that
one "ought" to put antifreeze in one's car.
It is true that on this model the allegiance of the officials is voluntary and based on an appeal to self-interest, rather than a threat of
force. Thus, one cannot describe the system as working only by
"obliging." But what is needed is an explanation of how the fact
of voluntary allegiance by itself adds an adequate concept of "obligation" to the system. As noted in our discussion of Austin, "henchmen" officials need only have the same reasons of self-interest for
continuing to carry out the gunman's orders. Even in the case of
a single ultimate sovereign who issues orders backed by threats to
all citizens, including officials, the sovereign's continued acceptance
of his "right" to govern is presumably a voluntary one. Nor can the
point be that as soon as a certain number of people (more than one)
accept the system, one has an "obligation" in a sense one did not
28. That this appears to be Hart's view can be seen· from the following passage:
Those who accept the authority of a legal system look upon it from the internal
point of view, and express their sense of its requirements in internal statements
couched in the normative language which is common to both law and morals:
"I (You) ought", "I (he) must", "I (they) have an obligation". Yet they are
not thereby committed to a moral judgment that it is morally right to do what
the law requires.
Id. at 199.
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before. Austin's model also contemplates the possibility that the
sovereign might actually be located in a "partnership" of several individuals ( as in the case of members of Parliament or the members
of a ruling triumvirate). If moves of this sort are sufficient to avoid
Hart's criticism of the gunman model, then the distinction between
Hart's theory and Austin's begins to disappear.
It may be possible to view Hart's model as an advance over Austin's by distinguishing the reasons for accepting a rule from the kind
of criticsm that occurs when one deviates from the rule. At one
point, in fact, Hart seems to suggest that the kind of criticism as
well as the fact that criticism occurs is an identifying characteristic
of rules of obligation, of which legal rules are a subclass. Such
rules, Hart explains, are not only supported by serious social pressure,
but are also "thought important because they are believed to be
necessary to the maintenance of social life or some highly prized
feature of it."29 This passage comes close to suggesting that the
internal attitude of those who accept such rules is one of "justifed
normativity"-i.e., that criticism is designed in part to remind one
of the merits of the accepted rules. But this view contrasts sharply
with Hart's insistence that rules can be accepted for reasons that
have nothing to do with the merits of the rules: demands for conformity can presumably be made simply because the rules are accepted
(for whatever reasons) by other members of the group.
One way to reconcile these passages, while at the same time distinguishing Hart's theory from Austin's, is to view the judge as one
views the player of a game or the member of a social club. In the
case of games, the "merits" of the particular rules of the game are
irrelevant to the claim that one has an obligation to follow the rules
when playing. One may believe, for example, that chess would be
a better game without the provision for castling-indeed, that the
provision is inimical to the true "spirit" or "purpose" of the game,
which, one may think, is to encourage slashing attacks and middleof-the-board king hunts. But even if one were correct in one's appraisal of what the game of chess is all about, one's obligation is to
play by the accepted rules until they are changed by authorized procedures. Similarly, members of a social club may believe that rules
of the club regarding, for example, admission standards for new
members, are not only morally unjust but also inimical to the club's
purposes. Failure to observe such rules will nonetheless be met with
criticism until they are changed, regardless of the correctness of
29. Id. at 85.
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one's appraisal of the rules on the merits. In both cases what underlies such criticism is the fact that others accept a rule plus some reason (for example, tacit agreement to play by the rules) that explains
why acceptance by some calls for compliance by others, regardless
of disagreement about the merits of the accepted rules.
This view of Hart's theory explains why a judge may have many
reasons for "accepting" the rule of recognition-for agreeing to
play-ranging from self-interest to a belief that the "game" he is
playing is morally justified. It also explains why the judge who fails
to conform, whatever his reasons for accepting the rule of recognition, will face criticism of an arguably different sort from that which
the judge as henchman faces. He must either follow the rules or
get out of the game, resign from the club. If Austin's theory is the
"gunman situation writ large," Hart's, as one commentator has observed, is "Monopoly writ large."30
D.

An Alternative View: The Judge as Priest

If one turns from the narrow class of jurisprudential literature
deliberately aimed at analysis of the concept of law to the broader
class of legal literature in general, one soon discovers a persistent
alternative view of the judge that casts him in the metaphorical role
of a priest. Evidence of this view's persistence is furnished in part
by the fact that it has long been the object of scornful attack by realists and positivists alike, eager to debunk the myth that lies behind
the metaphorical image. The myth, presumably, is the idea, most
often associated with natural law theories, that there is an essential
link between law and justice, and that the judge's task, accordingly,
is the secular equivalent of the priest's: both seek the normative
standards that govern human conduct in ideals that transcend positive law or positive morality.
The "judge as priest" is not the only metaphor that expresses
this idea. In a well-known passage, Blackstone refers to judges as
"the living oracles" of the law. 31 Bentham, in response, makes no
attempt to conceal his sarcasm in accusing "the great oracle of English jurisprudence" of "wandering in a labyrinth of rights and wrongs,
and duties, and obligations and laws of nature, and other fictitious
entities."32 Austin is scarcely less constrained in attacking the view
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30. Noonan, Book Review, 7 NATL. L. FORUM 169, 177 (1962).
31. 1 w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69. See also J. DAWSON, THE
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of the Roman law compiler, Ulpian, that "[l]aw being the creature
of justice, we the jurisconsults may be considered as her priests, for
justice is the goddess whom we worship, and to whose service we
are devoted. " 33
Among modem writers, few have explored this notion of the
"priestly power"34 of courts more engagingly than Thurman Arnold.
In The Symbols of Government, Arnold devotes several pages to a
discussion of the analogy between law and theology: "Just as jurisprudence today is the ultimate justification of the ideal of a rule of
law above men, so the theology of yesterday was the ultimate justification of a rule of a moral and logical god above men and even above
governments." 35 Arnold, of course, finds much in reality that does
not correspond to the ideal. At the same time, he is far more sympathetic than Austin or Bentham to the impulses of the "incurably
romantic human race" 36 which seem to make, it impossible to escape
from or ignore this ideal element in the attitudes of people toward
their fundamental legal institutions.
This latter observation suggests a second idea implicit in the
metaphor of the judge as priest, an idea that does not require linking
that metaphor solely to natural law claims connecting legal and moral
validity. One may agree that standards can be identified as "legal,"
even though they cannot be justified on moral or other grounds, and
yet see in the metaphor an attempt to express the idea that those
who accept the fundamental norms of the legal system believe that
the system is so justified. Expressed in the terminology we have
been using in this essay, the metaphor at least suggests that the concept of obligation among those who accept the system is a c~ncept
of justified normativity. Nonconforming behavior will be met, ultimately, with critical reactions designed to show that the ultimate
rule of recognition is justified on its merits and for that reason
"ought" to be accepted.
A theory of law that made this description of the internal attitude
of the officials of the system an essential aspect of the concept of
law can be characterized in broad outline by contrasting the view
of law that emerges from such a theory with Hart's view. First, the
new theory agrees with Hart's in making the existence of a legal system dependent on the acceptance of the basic rules by at least the
33.
34.
35.
36.

J.

AUSTIN, supra

T. ARNOLD, THE
Id. at 59.
Id. at 71.

note 8 (Library of Ideas ed. 1954), at 189.
186 (1962); see id. at 206, 224.
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officials of the system. But the theory adds the qualification that
the officials must also in good faith believe (and claim) that these
rules are acceptable (in the sense of being worthy of acceptance)
by those who are subject to the system's rules.
Second, this claim of acceptability is essentially a moral claima claim that the rules have value for the group in question and thus
deserve allegiance. The claim has a moral character because it is
backed by showing that there are good reasons (which may be selfregarding or moral reasons) for all subjects to accept the system's
norms. 37 Grossly characterized, the theory essentially links "law,"
not with "justice in fact," but with a "claim to justice" on the part
of the system's officials.
Third, it is consistent with the theory that those who disagree
with the attempted justification of the basic rules and do not accept
the system may view the legal system as purely coercive-"obliging"
rather than imposing obligations. Indeed, private citizens who believe that the implicit claim of acceptability is not made in good faith
or is totally indefensible will perhaps be more outraged at the perceived hypocrisy of the system than they might have been if law
made no pretense to be anything but coercive. 38
Fourth, it is also consistent with the theory that judges who do
not believe the system is justified may "accept" the role of judge
and work within that role to change or subvert the system. It is not
consistent with the theory that all judges may in this manner ignore
the merits of the rules they accept, finding legal obligation solely
in the fact that others have accepted the rules. Demands for conformity must be supported by more than simply pointing to the fact
of acceptance. That kind of criticism, however valid in the case of
a game, would not under this theory support a claim of legal obligation. The question of how many officials must believe the system
is acceptable for it to be "legal" cannot be precisely answered any
37. See K. BAIER, THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW 309 (1958).
38. Recent "political trials," in which defendants have attacked the legitimacy of
the entire regime, provide additional evidence that this internal view of law is a persistent phenomenon. The response of the Supreme Court to attempts at trial disruption also illustrates how explicit the "claim to justice" on the part of a judge can be:
As guardians of the public welfare, our state and federal judicial systems strive
to administer equal justice to the rich and the poor, the good and the bad, the
native and foreign born of evecy race, nationality, and religion. Being manned
by humans, the courts are not perfect and are bound to make some errors.
But, if our courts are to remain what the Founders intended, the citadels of
justice, their proceedings cannot and must not be infected with the sort of
scurrilous, abusive language and conduct paraded before the Illinois trial judge
in this case.
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 346-47 (1970).
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more than Austin could say how extensive the habit of obedience
must be or Hart could say how many officials must accept the rule
of recognition. It is sufficient, perhaps, to suggest that those officials whose acceptance is necessary for the existence of a legal system must also claim that the system is acceptable.
Finally, it should be noted that the basic claim that must be made
in a "legal" system under this theory is that the fundamental, constitutional design-the rule of recognition-is acceptable. Particular rules may arise that are difficult to justify or defend except on
the ground that they are the product of a basic legal system that is
itself worth preserving. In creating particular laws, one may, for example, often be unable to do more than consider all relevant competing interests in producing a compromise that completely satisfies no
one. The only claim that need be made in such a case is that the
lawmaking process remains an acceptable one, despite occasional
substantive results that on the merits cannot be specifically justified.
III.

TowARD

A DEFINITION OF LAW

As an empirical matter it could probably be established that all
four views of the internal attitudes toward legal obligation discussed
above are held at various times and in varying degrees in all or most
legal systems. The attempt to do more than this and to claim that
one view is a necessary feature of the concept of "law" presents the
problem discussed at the outset of this essay: why is it not enough
simply to note these theoretical differences without worrying about
whether a social order that did not include a particular concept of
obligation should be classified as a "legal system"?
The answer to that question is beyond the scope of this essay,
but it may be helpful to compare the theory that would result, assuming that the definitional problem could be resolved, with the
theories we have been discussing. Kelsen, we have seen, seems to
assume that the concept of justified normativity is an essential aspect
of law, although he does not argue for it. The theory suggested
here, then, may be viewed as an attempt to bring out from behind
the veil of "presupposition" this implicit assumption in Kelsen's
work.
The primary contrast to Hart's theory lies in the suggestion that
legal systems cannot be satisfactorily analogized to the game model.
To tell the judge who questions the rules of the system that his choice
is to play by the rules or resign ignores the fact that, unlike the player
in a game, the judge cannot escape. His choice is either to become
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a private citizen and be "obliged" by the system or to agree to serve
as a judge and thus incur the additional minimal obligation associated
with the "tacit" agreement to play by the basic rules. Similarly, unlike a social club, legal systems do not purport to regulate the relations of members only. Their "rules" extend to nonmembers as
well; indeed that is their primary purpose. To respond to the judge
who asks why he ought to apply such rules with a reminder that
those are the rules of the "club" ignores the real concern that
prompts his inquiry: what justifies my imposition of the club's coercive power on nonmembers?
There remains, then, the contrast between the coercive model
of law and a model that sees law as making an essential claim to
justice. Implicit in the latter model is the suggestion that there are
practical or theoretical advantages in distinguishing the primary
means of effecting social control into three basic categories: coercive (organized sanctions alone); legal (organized sanctions plus a
claim of acceptability); and moral (a claim of acceptability alone).
I have been careful not to suggest that a definition of law that requires a claim of acceptability to be made imports substantive, moral
tests into the definition. The minimum claim to legitimacy may after
all be the Hobbesian one that any law is better than none, ·at least
if minimum protections for person and property are provided. But
it is doubtful that officials in modern states will be able to resort in
good faith to the minimum Hobbesian justification for the basic rules
they accept.
In this respect, the alternative view of law suggested here lies
somewhere between that of the rigid, natural-law theorist on the one
hand, who refuses to call unjust law "law," and the extreme positivist
on the other, who refuses to withhold the name of law from norms
that, no matter how unjust, can produce the proper pedigree. Under
the view suggested here, the actual justice or injustice of a system of
norms is irrelevant to the system's status as "legal," and to that extent, the theory is consistent with positivism. But the theory refuses
to view legal systems and legal validity as a matter of pedigree alone.
It requires officials to claim and believe in the justice of the system's
basic rules, which then (and only then) converts the system into a
"legal system," however unjustified in fact such claims may be
thought to be. This demand that the officials pay heed to the moral
acceptability of the system they enforce may well furnish some small
theoretical, and no small practical, limitations on the ability of an
official to issue commands and at the same time to appeal to respect
for "the law" in urging obedience to those commands.

